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The federal government has engaged in various programs designed
to effect the self-sufficiency of Indians by means of granting certain
property rights in land. In this article the authors, Mr. Fiske and Mr.
Wilson examine the impact of the federal income tax laws on such programs. The authors discuss the application of the federal tax to Indian
income and suggest that, in some cases, the tax burden may represent
an obstacle to Indian self-sufficiency.
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INTRODUCTION

T

American Indians, often having been deprived of the
most productive of their ancestral lands and forced for
decades to eke out substandard living from marginal lands,
in many individual instances now may be on the verge of
land-based financial independence. Yet, as they seek that
goal, they face an increasing tax burden upon their limited
resources which may contribute significantly to further denial of their rightful place in the national economy. Ironically, it is an agency of their trustee, the United States, with
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Copyright

0

1975 by the University of Wyoming.

*Partner, Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, Walker and Grover, Denver, Colo.;
B.S., 1955, University of Kansas; J.D., 1960, University of Kansas; Member of the American, Colorado and Denver Bar Associations; Trustee, Rocky
Mtn. Min. L. Fdn.; Past Chairman, Public Lands & Land Use Committee,
ABA Natural Resources Law Section and Mineral Law Section of the Colorado Bar Association.
**Associate, Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, Walker and Grover, Denver, Colo.;
B.S.B.A., 1966, University of Denver; M.S.B.A., 1967, University of Denver;
J.D., 1970, University of Southern California; Member of Colorado, Denver
and California Bar Associations; Certified Public Accountant (Colorado).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1975

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 10 [1975], Iss. 1, Art. 2

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. X

the duty to foster their interests, which raises this obstacle

to their aspirations.
No responsible person argues that Indians always and
in every circumstance should be free of responsibility to
contribute to the support of the national government. Nor
do reasonable people insist upon current favoritism or special
treatment simply to offset prior injustice. As Indians individually achieve an economic level comparable to that of
most other Americans, then it is to be expected that they
will be taxed appropriately by the United States. Even now
their income earned from salaried employment, professional
or occupational endeavors, and investments other than in
their restricted lands is subject to federal tax by the same
standards applicable to others.
But, by long-standing federal policy, prescribed by congressional legislation, Indians are entitled to unique treatment in certain circumstances. That policy is to afford them
protection under the trusteeship or "guardian/ward" concept of their relationship with the nation,' and to aid them in
achieving financial self-sufficiency. As to income derived by
Indians from restricted Indian land, there appears to be a
conflict between the federal policy and laws pertaining to
Indians and general federal income tax law. It may be more
accurate to say that the confict is due to interpretation of
the tax laws by the Internal Revenue Service. It is submitted
that such interpretation is both illogical and inconsistent with
federal Indian law.
This article deals exclusively with federal income taxation of the proceeds realized by an Indian from restricted
Indian lands. As a citizen,2 an Indian may privately acquire
i.

For a discussion of this relationship, see F. COHEN, HANDsOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, ch. 5, ch. 8, §§ 8 & 9 (1941); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERRIOR FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, ch. II, ch. VIII, §§ H & I (1958). See aZlo,
Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 73 Wash. 2d 677, 440 P.2d 442
(1968).
2. See, e.g., Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, incorporated into 8
U.S.C. § 1401 (a) (2) (1970). Citizenship also has been acquired by various
Indians and tribes by specific treaties and statutes, such as the General
Allotment Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 25 U.S.C. ch. 9
(1970). See also F. COHEN, supra note 1, at ch. 8, § 2; U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 1, at ch. VIII, § B.
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and utilize land in the same fashion and with the same independence as any other person. That land is not restricted
"Indian land", and income from it is subject to taxation
under the Internal Revenue Code. But land held by or for
particular tribes or tribal organizations, or which is owned
by individual Indians as a result of direct allotments from the
United States which has not been released from restricted
status, is considered restricted. Such restricted land cannot
be sold, encumbered, leased or otherwise disposed of without
the approval of the United States and then only pursuant to
special laws and regulations designed for the protection of
Indian interests.'
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The early national policy relating to Indians was to destroy their historical tribal organizations and concepts of communal interest in land. To this end, under the provisions of
the General Allotment Act of 1887' each Indian, or Indian
family, was to be given a specific tract of land, so that the
Indians would become independent landholders and individually self-supporting in the ideal of the white man's culture.
Indians were allotted tracts of from 40 acres to 160 acres,
depending upon the character of the land and the circumstances of the allottees.
Under the General Allotment Act, the United States retained title in allotted tracts in trust for the allottees for a
period of twenty-five years, with further provision for indefinite administrative extension of the trust status. Generally,
the trust status of allotted lands has been extended to date
and beyond by executive orders.' When the trust status of an
allotted tract is removed according to law, it is then held in
unrestricted fee by the allottee or his successors."
3. See F. COHEN, OUpra note 1, at Ch. 11, §§ 4-6, ch. 15, §§ 18-20; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 1, at ch. IX.
4. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, codified at 25 U.S.C. ch. 9
(1970).
5. Exec. Order No. 10,191, 15 Fed. Reg. 8889 (1950) ; 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1970).
6. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1970).
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The national policy was reversed forty years ago by the
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934,'
which abolished the allotment system. Under the Indian Reorganization Act, the integrity of Indian tribal organization
is fostered, and Indian lands are preserved in tribal ownership under tribal administration, subject to supervision and
restrictions under federal law and regulations.' The abolition of the allotment system and the substitution of tribal
ownership did not extinguish allotments which had been
previously made. Consequently, there exist today both unpatented allotted lands and lands in tribal ownership, each
type being subject to trust supervision by the United States
and restrictions upon alienation. Both categories are considered to be "restricted land" or "Indian land".
To incorporate previously allotted but unpatented lands
into the communal or tribal ownership concept, various mechanisms have been utilized. A common example of these devices is the "exchange assignment."' However, the termination of the allotment system did not put an end to individual
rights in tribal lands. Although a tribe retains ownership of
its land, individual Indians may be granted possessory rights
or similar interests by the tribe.'" In addition, various other
conventional types of interests may be had with respect to
tribal lands by both Indians and non-Indians, e.g, grazing
or timber cutting permits, leases and licenses." Thus, today
7. 48 Stat. 984, as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 461-69 (1970).
8. E.g., 25 C.F.R. ch. I subch. K-Q (1973).
9. For example, THE LAND CODE OF THE COLORADO RrvFR INDIAN TRIBES (1940)
provided:
Any member of the tribe who owns any restricted or unrestricted land or any interest therein may, with approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, voluntarily transfer his interest in such
land to the tribe in exchange for an assignment of the same or
other land of equal value. If the assignee prefers, he may receive,
in lieu of a specific tract of land, a proportionate share in a larger
grazing unit. Assignments made under this section shall be known
.......
as "exchange assignments." !
10. See, e.g, United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160 (4th Cir. 1974) which dealt
with tax on income earned by a Cherokee by use of tribal land. The court
used the term "possessory holding" which was described as the right -to
use and occupy a parcel of undivided land under Tribal and Bureau of
Indian Affairs regulations. THE LAND CODE OF THE COLORADO RivER INDIAN
TRIBES (1956) provides for a "Standard Assignment" which grants to a
tribal member exclusive rights to use of a tract and all agricultural income
derived from it by him.
11. See Stevens v. Comnm'r, 452 F.2d 741 (9th Cir.*1971)..
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restricted Indian lands are held in various forms-unpatented
allotments, possessory interests, leases, permits and licenses.
In addition to restrictions upon Indian land, some reference should be made to the legal status of the individual Indian himself. In a limited sense he may be referred to as
"incompetent" or "non-competent", that being a reference
to his legal entitlement to manage his own affairs. Most
frequently it is further limited to his legal capacity to encumber, alienate or dispose of his real property. In that
sense the term describes the legal restrictions imposed upon
an Indian in dealing with restricted land."3
TAXATION OF AN INDIAN TRIBE

Indian tribes have a unique position in the political and
governmental framework of the United States. Chief Justice
Marshall, in an early Supreme Court case, recognized that
Indian tribes were considered distinct political bodies. 4
Later the Supreme Court described the status of tribes in
the following language:
[T]hey were, and always have been, regarded as
having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as
nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty but as a separate people, with the power
of regulating their internal and social relations, and
thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or
of the State within whose limits they resided. 5
The preservation of the tribe as a distinct political entity by
the decisions of the Supreme Court has been summarized by
the U. S. Department of Interior as follows:
The whole course of judicial decision on the
nature of Indian tribal powers is marked by adherence to three. fundamental principles: (1) An
12. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at ch. 8, § 8.; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

THE INTERIOR,

aupra
note 1, at ch. VIII, § H.
13. See 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1970).
14. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
15. United States v. Kagana, 118 U.S. 375,381-82 (1886).
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Indian tribe possessed, in the first instance, all the
powers of any sovereign State. (2) Conquest rendered the tribe subject to the legislative power of
the United States and, in substance, terminated the
external powers of sovereignty of the tribe e.g., its
power to enter into treaties with foreign nations,
but did not by itself terminate the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local self-government. (3) These internal powers were, of course,
subject to qualification by treaties and by express
legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly
qualified, many powers of internal sovereignty have
remained in the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of government.'
Thus, the quasi-sovereignty of Indian tribes is an extension
of their original sovereignty. A consequence of such sovereignty is exemption from taxation by the national govern-

ment. A tribe is not a taxable entity, and, therefore, the federal taxing statutes do not apply to Indian tribes."
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INDIANS

It once appeared that there might be individual immunity
of Indians from application of the federal income tax laws,'8
particularly as to any income earned from restricted Indian
land.' 9 However, in spite of the rules of construction (i) that
tax exemptions for Indians are to be liberally construed for
their benefit, and (ii) that general laws enacted by Congress
do not apply to Indians unless they are so worded as to clearly
show an intent to include Indians in their operation,2" it has
now been conclusively determined that individual Indians are
subject to general federal income tax laws.2 '
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 1, at 398.
17. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 55.
18. United States v. Homeratha, 40 F.2d 305 (W.D. Okla. 1930).
19. Chouteau v. Comm'r, 38 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1930), afj'd, 283 -U.S. 691
(1931).
20. See, e.g., Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S.
363 (1930); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912); Chouteau v. Comm'r,
supra note 19.
21. Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (1931); Superintendent of Five Civilized
Tribes v. Comm'r, 295 U.S. 418 (1935); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1
(1956) ;Holt v. Comm'r, 364 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1966).

16. U.S.
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Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code22 imposes an income tax on the income of every individual from whatever
source derived. It is this section and its precursors that the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) and the
Internal Revenue Service have utilized in order to tax the
income from the restricted land of an individual Indian.
Ppx-Capoeman DECISIONS

The judicial foundation for the federal taxation of income of individual Indians was a trilogy of cases before the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals which were argued and submitted together." Each case proved to be significantly different on its facts although they all involved income from Osage
headright interests in minerals."4
Mary Blackbird was a member of the Osage Tribe. The
principal part of her income for the tax years in question was
her headright revenue. She and the other taxpayers maintained that they were not liable for the taxes assessed nor
even subject to the income tax statute. The court of appeals
agreed in her case, saying:
As to Mary Blackbird, we are disposed to yield our
assent to the soundness of the contention. She is a
restricted full-blood Osage. Her property is under
the supervising control of the United States. She is
its ward, and we cannot agree that because the income statute, (citations omitted), subjects "the net
income of every individual" to the tax, this is alone
sufficienit to make the Acts applicable to her. Such
a holding would be contrary to the almost unbroken
policy of Congress in dealing with its Indian wards
and their affairs. Whenever they and their interests
22. 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1970).
23. Chouteau v. Comm'r, supra note 19. Blackbird v. Comm'r and Pettit v.
Comm'r were companion cases consolidated for hearing by the court.
24. The oil, gas and coal in the allotted lands of tribal members were reserved
for a period of years for the tribe, which granted leases for the extraction
of the minerals. The royalties therefrom were placed in the United States
Treasury to the credit of the tribe and distributed to the individual members according to the tribal roll on a pro-rata basis. The particular allotment act applicable to the tribe provided that all property interests of
intestate deceased members descended according to the laws of Oklahoma.
The headrights or pro-rata shares were considered to be property interests.

Id.
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have been the subject affected by legislation they
have been named and their interests specifically
dealt with.2
The court further noted that:
The mineral reserves under the lands are held
in trust by the United States for the tribe and its
members, and are being developed under its control
and direction as an instrumentality for the best interests and advancement of the members of the
tribe who are still recognized as dependents on Governmental care; and it seems unreasonable to hold
that a general tax statute should be applied to them
when they are not named nor intention in some way
expressed that it applies to them."
Amarillis Pettit was not an Indian, but from her children, who were members of the Tribe, she had inherited
lands allotted to them under the Osage Allotment Act. The
revenue involved in her case was her headright income. The
court denied her claim of tax immunity, saying:
[she] took [her] lands without any restrictions on its
disposition. The United States has no control over
her interests and she is in no sense its ward. She receives her share of the royalties and bonuses on the
mineral deposits in accordance with the terms of
the Act, but it is not held and paid to her on the part
of the Government for her protection as its dependent ward.2 7
Henry Choteau, or Chouteau, was a member of the Osage
Tribe. However, he had been granted a certificate of competency by the Secretary of the Interior. Again, the revenue
involved was headright income from oil and gas operations.
As to him, the court also rejected the claim of tax immunity,
saying:
His certificate of competency bestowed upon him unrestricted management of his affairs and gave him
25. Chouteau v. Comni'r, aupra note 19, at 977.
26. Id. at 978.
27. Id. at 979.
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full power to use and dispose of his property according to his own judgment. Thereafter his pro-rata
share in the mineral production was paid to him not
as a ward of the Government. It was paid to him
under the terms of the Act, but was not a Governmental instrumentality and means to gradually bring
him to a state of competency and independence. By
provision of the Act it was determined that he was
competent to have exclusive management of his own
affairs when the certificate was issued to him. He
obtained it at his request and with the Government's
consent and approval, and thereupon he assumed
the same burdens that the law imposes on every other
individual property owner. We think his civil status
thus fixed brought him within the terms of the
income tax statutes.2 8
The three holdings clearly showed the court's concern at that
time for the status of the individual involved. If such person
was a non-Indian or in the emancipated legal status of a
non-Indian, then he was subjected to taxation the same as
non-Indians. If, however, the individual was a personally
restricted Indian the tax law was not applicable, absent a
showing of contrary Congressional intent.
Shortly after Chouteau,another significant Indian taxation case, United States v. Homeratha,29 was considered by
the U.S. District Court in Oklahoma. Homeratha, a noncompetent Indian, had been given allotted acreage by his mother,
who was also a noncompetent Indian. The sole question presented was whether or not tax was payable on income from
the land. The court cited the then general rule promulgated
in Chouteau as to Mary Blackbird."0 However, the key issue
in the court's view was whether the land retained its restricted character upon its transfer. The court ruled that it did
and, since the land was also owned by and was in the possession of a non-competent Indian, the income derived therefrom
was not subject to taxation. From the decision, it would appear that the court adopted a two-pronged test in that both
the status of the Indian and that of the land were considered.
28. Id. at 979-80.
29. United States v. Homeratha, supra note 18.
30. Chouteau v. Comm'r, supra note 19.
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However, a careful reading of the decision shows that the
court considered the restriction on the land as being only
applicable to a similarly restricted Indian. Thus, the court
really held that Homeratha ". . . a noncompetent Indian,
being a ward of the government, is not subject to the income
tax law."'"
The following year, the Chouteau case itself, the companion case to Mary Blackbird, was reviewed by the Supreme
Court. 2 The Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Chouteau, having received his certificate of competency, was not exempt from taxation. It has been argued
that the Supreme Court's decision "completely undermined
the one-year-old Blackbird holding with respect to the effect
of general legislation upon Indian tribes." 4 However, while
the Supreme Court's language seemingly cast doubt on the
exemption of Indians from federal taxation, the facts of
Choteau were so basically different from the Blackbird situation that it can be argued that the decisions are not inconsistent. In addition, it is to be noted that the Supreme
Court did not mention Blackbird. Therefore, at that time it
could be still argued that noncompetent Indians were not subject to federal taxation.
In Choteau the Supreme Court almost summarily held
that the income tax laws were applicable to such a member
of the Osage Tribe. It reached this conclusion on the generality of those laws and the absence of any express exemption
of Indians. It then dealt at greater length with the question
of the treatment of the income itself.
The Supreme Court in reviewing the applicable Indian
legislation and treaties recognized the policy to emancipate
the Indians from their status as wards and to prepare them
United States v. Homeratha, supra note 18, at 306.
Choteau v. Burnet, supra note 21. Note that in the decision of the court of
appeals the case is identified as Ckouteau v. Comm'r. Reference in this
article to Choteau is to the Supreme Court decision.
33. The Supreme Court stated in its opinion that "nothing in this case turns
on his ownership" of his allotted land, although it then proceeded to discuss the principles and procedures of the allotment plan in reaching its
decision. Id. at 692.
34. J. WHITE, TAXING THosE THEY FOUND HERE 54 (1972).
31.
32.
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for the gradual release of their property to their own individual management. That plan, according to the decision,
involved not only advantages but also the burden of paying
taxes. Upon being issued a certificate of competency, an
Osage was said to be subject to a tax upon his allotment. In
spite of a statement in the opinion that the case did not turn
on ownership of the allotted lands, the Court seemed to give
considerable weight to the fact that the Indian's allotted lands
had been freed of restrictions.
The Court also noted that the share of income received
by the individual from the tribal oil and gas leases was payable to him without restriction upon his use of the funds so
paid. That, together with the fact that the individual had received his certificate of competency, completed the portrait
of the Indian as being legally indistinguishable for income
tax purposes from any other citizen.
In its conclusion the Court rejected the arguments that
the distribution of the tribal income to its members was a
gift not subject to income taxation, and that because tribal
income held by the tribe was not subject to state taxation it
should not be subject to federal taxation. The Court based
its decision on the latter argument on the fact that the income
had actually been distributed to the individuals and was no
longer held by the tribe.
In evaluating or distinguishing this case, particularly
with regard to Blackbird, it should be kept in mind that the
Indian was himself emancipated, and it was not income from
his own allotted or assigned lands which was subject to taxation, but only his share of the distribution of income of the
tribe.
Somewhat later the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
entered three opinions which greatly diminished the idea that
the tax exemption it had found earlier in Chouteau, as to
Mary Blackbird, was based upon an Indian's personal status.35 Bagby v. United States involved income from allotted
35. Bagby v. United States, 60 F.2d 80 (10th Cir. 1932) ; Pitman v. Comm'r, 64
F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1933); Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v.
Comm'r, 75 F.2d 183 (10th Cir. 1935). The latter case is also known as the
Sandy Fox case.
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lands of a 1/16 Indian-blood minor enrolled in the Creek
Tribe. The particular allotment act applicable to that tribe
provided that restricted lands which passed into the ownership of non-Indians or less than half-blood Indians did so free
of restrictions. " The court interpreted the statute as placing
such an individual as Bagby in the same tax category as nonIndians insofar as income from this type of land was concerned. The court, however, did not change its earlier position that the income from restricted lands, at least initially,
retained the same restricted character as the land from which
it was derived. But it did acknowledge that the restricted
character of land could be changed, and stated:
Of course, the royalties and bonus received were
not the land itself, but the tax here in question is in
substance a tax on the land (citation omitted) which
section 4 of the Act subjects "to taxation and all
other civil burdens as though it were the property
of other persons than allottees of the Five Civilized Tribes. "
In Pitman v. Comm'r 8 the court of appeals based tax immunity upon the status of the land rather than that of the Indian. The taxpayer was a full-blood Creek Indian deriving income from both restricted and unrestricted lands. In analyzing
the applicable allotment statute, the court held the former nontaxable and the latter taxable.
The Sandy Fox case, 9 the third in this series of decisions, was destined to become the next major Supreme Court
decision on taxation of Indians. It involved funds derived
from the restricted allotment of an Indian. The income from
the land in excess of the needs of the individual Indian was
invested by the government, and the proceeds from the investment were collected and held in trust under direction
of the Secretary of the Interior. Those proceeds (in later
cases and discussions termed "reinvestment income") were
determined by the court of appeals to be subject to federal
36.
37.
38.
39.

Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 199, 35 Stat. 312.
Bagby v. United States, supra note 35, at 81.
Pitman v. Comm'r, supra note 35.
The Sandy Fox case, supra note 35.
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income tax. Upon reviewing precedential cases, including
Blackbird and Chouteau, the court came to the conclusion
that an Indian is an individual embraced within the term
"every individual" as used in the tax statute, and that any
exemption from taxation is based upon the nature of property giving rise to it and not from the blood or race of the
individual. The dissenting judge, who had written the Blackbird opinion, felt that the Sandy Fox decision completely abrogated Blackbird. It seems clear that Sandy Fox represented a
change from the position of the court of appeals enunciated in
Blackbird that general legislation could not be applied to
Indians absent a showing of specific congressional intent to
have it apply. In Sandy Fox, it was stated:
The whole question is one of statutory construction. Congress has the power to tax the income of
an Indian from any source, just as it has the power
to exempt all his property from state taxes. What
did Congress intend?. The Supreme Court has held
it did not intend to exempt Indians as such from federal taxes; that it did not intend to exempt restricted
property as such from state taxes; that property
acquired for investment is not a federal instrumentality in the sense the original allotment is. While
the question is not free from doubt, we are of the
opinion that, as construed by the Supreme Court, the
intent of Congress was to subject the -income from
investments of surplus funds, as well as the investments themselves, to taxation.
This view is supported by the administrative and
legislative history . .4.
The court then reasoned that Congress had intended to
include Indians within the all-inclusive net of taxation, by its
silence on the matter of Indian exemption while re-enacting
general tax legislation. Of course, as every student of the law
knows, the silence of Congress is not necessarily determinative of its intent. Perhaps the court was influenced by an
inability to justify a distinction between a moneyed Indian
and a moneyed non-Indian. This possibility is highlighted
by the following statement of the court:
40. Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Comm'r, supra note 35, at 186.
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Congress is therefore familiar with the distinction
between income from the original heritage of the
Indian and other income. There is, moreover, a reason for the distinction. The income from the allotments of many or most of the Indians is barely sufficient to support them; but oil was discovered upon
the allotments of some, and those received an income much larger than their needs; when that surplus was invested and in turn produced income, there
is reason in requiring such wealthy Indians to contribute to the cost of the government whose services
they enjoy.4 '
The Sandy Fox decision was affirmed by the Supreme
Court.4 Although the Court stated that "inalienability and
nontaxability go hand in hand; and that it is not lightly to be
assumed that Congress intended to tax the ward for the benefit of the guardian,"" the opinion indicated that general
taxing statutes apply unless some exemption can be plainly
derived "from agreements with the [Indians] or some Act
of Congress dealing with their affairs."4 4 In reviewing the
pertinent authorities pertaining to the Creek Indians, the
Supreme Court could find no such exemption for the type
of income involved. It even supported the dicta of the court
of appeals, stating: "The taxpayer here is a citizen of the
United States, and wardship with limited power over his
property does not without more, render him immune from
the common burden."4 5
Immediately following the Supreme Court decision in
Sandy Fox, and as a consequence of it, it was assumed by
most that restricted Indians were subject to the federal inHowcome tax similar to their non-Indian counterparts.
ever, the significance of this case, and a limiting feature of it,
is that it determined the taxability of reinvestment income
rather than income derived directly from land.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 186.
Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Comm'r, supra note 21.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 421.
On March 11, 1938, by Misc. Circular No. 3240 of the Office of Indian Affairs, United States Department of the Interior, John Collier, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, issued instructions to all Indian agency superintendents as follows:
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Squire v. Capoeman: A

TOUCHSTONE

The next major decision in the development of the law
with respect to the federal taxation of individual Indians
was the Supreme Court's decision in Squire v. Capoeman.47
It is, perhaps, the most important recent case on the subject.
The Supreme Court's opinion put its earlier decisions in
Sandy Fox and Choteau in perspective and properly limited
their scope. 8
Capoewan dealt with land which had been allotted pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887 and a treaty
with the Quinaielt Tribe. The taxpayers, husband and wife,
were born on the reservation and were full-blood, noncompetent Quinaielt Indians. They had lived on the reservation all
their lives, with the exception of the time spent by the husband in military service during World War II. The husband
had received a "trust patent" (allotment certificate) for the
subject land, and the restrictions governing the land had
never been released. In 1943, the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
on behalf of the husband, contracted for the sale of standing
timber on his allotted land and received the payments due
for it. Four years later, the District Collector of Internal
Revenue demanded that the taxpayers file a tax return for
1943. A return was filed reporting the timber sale as longterm capital gain. The tax was paid, and, thereafter, the taxThe Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (295 U.S. 418), held that the income of Indians is
subject to the Federal income tax unless specifically exempted by
treaty or act of Congress.
Unless, therefore, there is specific exemption either by treaty
or act of Congress the Indians should file returns as well as other
citizens when their income is sufficient to bring them under the
terms of the Federal Income Tax Law.
See also, Strom v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 621 (1946), aff'd. 'mer., 158 F.2d 520
(9th Cir. 1947) (involving income from Indian fishing rights); Jones v.
Taunah, 186 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951);
Rev. Rul. 54-456, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 49. But cf. Rhodes v. U.S., 51-1 USTC
9209 (N.D. Okla. 1950) (including a refund action under the Act of
January 29, 1942, ch. 24, 56 Stat. 21, allowing refunds of taxes collected with
respect to restricted lands prior to 1031); Nicodemus v. United States, 132
F. Supp. 608 (D. Idaho 1965) following the opinion of the Ninth Circuit
in Squire v. Capoeman, 220 F.2d 349, (9th Cir. 1955), affg. 110 F. Supp.
924 (1953).
47. 351 U.S. 1 (1956). See also the lower court decisions cited note 46 supra.
48. Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Comm'r, supra note 21; Choteau
v. Burnet, supra note 21. The Capoeman Court limited Sandy Fox, at 9 of
its opinion and Choteau at n.19 of its opinion.
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payers sought a refund of the taxes contending that the proceeds from the sale of timber from allotted land were exempt
from taxation. The lower courts upheld the taxpayers' contention, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari because of
the apparent conflict between decisions of the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits. 9
The Supreme Court held the proceeds not taxable. What
is most important is the reasoning of the Supreme Court,
because courts, Indian taxpayers, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Internal Revenue Service cite the case as
authority for both taxability and nontaxability of Indian
income.
The government maintained that the Supreme Court
should treat the controversy as an ordinary tax case because
Indians generally are subject to income tax, and there was no
exemption applicable to the factual situation under any relevant statutes or treaties. As authority for its proposition, it
argued the general applicability of the taxing statute and
that the tax was upon the income derived from the land and
not upon the land itself. As to the latter argument, the government apparently took the position that the restricted
status of the land was immaterial. The Supreme Court cast
aside these contentions when Chief Justice Warren stated:
We agree with the Governament that Indians are
citizens and that in ordinary affairs of life, not governed by treaties or remedial legislation, they are
subject to the payment of income taxes as are other
citizens. We also agree that, to be valid, exemptions
to tax laws should be clearly expressed. But we cannot agree that taxability of respondents in these circumstances is unaffected by the treaty, the trust
patent or the Allotment Act. (Emphasis added)."
It is to be noted that the Internal Revenue Service and some
courts have overlooked the above-emphasized phrase and begin with the proposition that Indians, in general, are subject
49. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district
court in Capoeman noting that it conflicted with the decision of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Jones v. Taunah, supra note 46.
50. Squire v. Capoeman, supra note 47, at 6.
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to federal taxation. Furthermore, although the Supreme
Court restated its opinion that tax exemptions must be
"clearly expressed" it found an exemption in this case in
quite nonspecific statutory provisions.
The Court pointed out that the General Allotment Act
provided that title to allotted lands ultimately would pass
"free of all charge or encumbrance whatsoever," and this the
Court stated, "might well be sufficient to include taxation.""1
However, the decision held that a later amendment to the
Act, which stated that upon issuance of a final patent all
restrictions as to taxation shall be removed was a clear indication by Congress that until the lifting of restrictions, an
Indian allotment was "free from all taxes, both those in being
and those which might in the future be enacted.")2
The Capoeman opinion cited, with apparent approval, an
opinion of the Attorney General promulgated in 1925 to the
effect that there could not be imputed to Congress, under the
broad language of the taxing statutes, an intent to impose a
tax for the benefit of the government on income derived from
the restricted property of Indian wards." It is significant,
although seemingly contrary to its language in Sandy Fox,
that the Supreme Court very liberally and affiTmatively construed Indian laws and treaties to find a Congressional intent
to exempt Indian income from taxation. The Court previously
had reviewed such authorities in Sandy Fox, but its position
51. Id. at 6-7.
52. Id. at 8. The amendment to the General Allotment Act referred to by the
Court antedated the enactment of the federal income tax laws, but the Court
felt that was irrelevant.
53. Id. at 8. See also 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 439 (1925) which provided in part
that the Attorney General was:
[Ulnable, by implication, to impute to Congress under the broad
language of our Internal Revenue Acts an intent to impose a tax
for the benefit of the Federal Government on income derived from
the restricted property of these wards of the nation; property
the management and control of which rests largely in the hands
of officers of the government charged by law with the responsibility
and duty of protecting the interests and welfare of these dependent
people. In other words, it is not lightly to be assumed that Congress
intended to tax the ward for the benefit of the guardian. Id. at
445.

See also F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 265.
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there was that an express exemption was necessary as distinguished from one created by implication. The Capoeman
opinion distinguished Sandy Fox, on the fact that it involved
only "reinvestment income." The Court in Capoeman felt
that it was necessary to preserve the land trust and income
derived directly therefrom in order to accomplish the purpose
of the allotment system, which was to protect the Indians'
interest and prepare them to take their place as independent,
qualified members of society. The real difference between
Sandy Fox and Capoeman seems to be what implications of
congressional intent the Court was willing to find, those
favorable to the Indians or those consistent with the position
of the taxing authorities.
It must be recognized that the Supreme Court in Capoeman was considering allotted land, and that it found specific
authority indicating that income from allotted land was free
from taxation. The Internal Revenue Service has sought to use
this factual basis of the Capoeman case as its delimiting factor in claiming that income derived from restricted but unallotted land is subject to individual taxation.
Another possibly significant factor in the factual context of Capoeman is that the land involved ". . . was forest
land, covered by coniferous trees from one hundred years to
several hundred years old. It was nwt adaptableto agricultural
purposes, and was of little value after the timber was cut."
(emphasis added)." If it was truly thought that the land
was worthless once the timber was cut, that fact might have
particular significance because the Supreme Court was concerned with safeguarding the benefit of the allotment to the
Indian. A different result might be had if the income from
Indian land is a recurring type, such as agricultural development, and not derived from a wasting enteTprise. One cannot
be certain how the legal difference might be postured, but a
nonwasting source of income might make it easier for the
Supreme Court or lower courts to find no tax exemption in54.

Squire v. Capoeman, supra note 47, at 4. See also the Court's concern with
economic value, Squire v. Capoeman, supra, note 47, at 10.
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asmuch as the income would not represent the loss, destruction or even diminution of the value of the land.55
POST

Capoeman

DEVELOP-ENTS

The Internal Revenue Service characteristically views
very narrowly the exemption established by Capoeman. As is
its practice, that agency acknowledges a claim to an exception
to the general tax laws only if the circumstances precisely fit
the type of factual situation involved in the particular judicial decision which validated the exemption. Consequently,
the Internal Revenue Service recognizes individual Indian
immunity only as to personal income firom allotted and restricted land. Although it is correct in not permitting application of the exemption to income from allotted land which is
now free of restrictions,it seems illogical not to recognize it
as to income from unallotted and restricted land. It is submitted that it should be the existence of the restricted trust
status, .ather than the status as allotted land, that is determinative. This is particularly important inasmuch as the
allotment system was abolished by the Indian Reorganization
Act in 1934."
The position of the Internal Revenue Service with regard
to income derived from unallotted and restricted tribal lands
is contained in Revenue Ruling 58-320."7 The ruling is premised upon the situation of an Indian cultivating unallotted
Indian tribal lands which were assigned to him by the tribe
for a nominal fee. The agency concludes that the Indian's
income is subject to taxation, basing its decision on its determination that there was no specific exemption provision in
any treaty or agreement with the Indian tribe involved or
in any act of Congress dealing with its affairs.
A more comprehensive position of the Internal Revenue
Service is stated in Revenue Ruling 67-284. 5 It asserts that
55. The Government took this pogition in its brief to the appellate court, at
least tacitly, in United States v. Critzer, supra note 10. However, the
court did not choose to deal with the issue.
56. 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq.
57. Rev. Ru]. 58-320, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 24. See also Rev. Rul. 56-342, 1956-2
CUM. BULL. 20.

58.

Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 55. See also Rev. Rul. 54-456, 1954-2
CUM. BULL. 49; Rev. Rul. 59-349, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 16; Rev. Rul. 63-244,
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since there is no provision in the Internal Revenue Code
which exempts an individual from federal income taxation
solely on the ground that he is an Indian, a fortiori,the exemption of Indians from the payment of tax must be plainly derived from treaties or agreements with the Indian tribes concerned, or some act of Congress dealing with Indian affairs.
The ruling, on the basis of Capoeman, sets forth the test of
the sole exemption which the Internal Revenue Service feels
compelled to recognize. The test involves five elements, each
of which must exist before an exemption will be deemed to
apply. They are:
1. The land in question is held in trust by the United
States Government;
2. Such land is restricted and allotted and is held for an
individual non-competent Indian, and not for the
tribe;
3. The income is "derived directly" from the land;
4. The statute, treaty or other authority involved
evinces congressional intent that the allotment be used
as a means of protecting the Indian until such time as
he becomes compctent; and
5. The authority in question contains language indicating clear congressional intent that the land, until
conveyed in fee simple to the allottee, is not to be
subject to taxation.
A problem with the Internal Revenue Service's reasoning is that many of the treaties, agreements, and legislative
acts were established long before the enactment of the laws
pertaining to federal income taxation. To the extent of legislation subsequent to the enactment of the income tax laws,
with the possible exception of the. Indian Reorganization Act,
the Indians have been dealt with on a more or less piecemeal
basis. Thus, rather than deal with exemptions on an ad hoc
1963-2 CUM. BULL. 21; Rev. Rul. 56-342, 1956-2 GUM. BULL. 20; Rev. Rul.
62-16, 1962-1 CUM. BULL. 7; Rev. Rul. 57-407, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 45; Rev.
Rul. 57-523, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 51; Rev. Rul. 58-341, 1958-2 CUM. BULL.
400; Rev. Rul. 59-354, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 24; Rev. Rul. 58-320, 1958-1 CuM.
BULL. 24.
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basis, Congress could be considered to have ict stand the
exemptions considered by many to have already existed, at
least as to noncompetent Indians and restricted lands. Additionally, the Indian Reorganization Act was protective legislation designed to safeguard the Indians from the diminution
of their lands which was occurring under the allotment program. The abolition of the allotment system should not be
considered as imposing a burden on the fruits of land which
is even more restricted than allotted land.
One of the first cases to apply Capoeman was Big Eagle
v. United States." It involved a factual situation comparable
0 While the
to Blackbird."
opinion is not surprising in terms
of its result, it makes several points which are important to
consider. Of major significance in Big Eagle is the negation
of the principal that "tax exemptions must be clearly expressed and cannot be granted by implication," and, the application of the principle that "statutes affecting Indians
must be liberally construed, with all doubtful expressions
being resolved in their favor." 1 While specifically rejecting
the Internal Revenue Service's insistence upon strict interpretation of tax exemption for an Indian, the court recognized
that tax exemption may have an effect on how or whether a
restricted Indian may achieve competency and independence.
Referring to the congressional policy behind both the General
Allotment Act and Osage Allotment Act, the court stated:
Parallel congressional purposes are apparent but the
basic purpose is the one alluded to in Capoeman and
that is to protect the property so that it will adequately serve the needs of the ward and finally bring
him to a state of competency and independence. This
chance is encowraged, if not guaranteed, by tax
exemption. (emphasis added).62
In spite of the policy basis for the court's decision, the Internal Revenue Service has sought to strictly limit the impact of
the decision.'
59. 300 F.2d 765 (Ct. Cl. 1962). A companion case, Red Eagle v. United States,
300 F.2d 772 (Ct. Cl. 1062) adopted the rationale of Big Eagle v. Uvated
States by reference.
60. Chouteau v. Comm'r, supra note 19.
61. Big Eagle v. United States, supra note 59, at 769.
62. Id. at 771-72.
63. Rev. Rul. 70r116, .701 CuM.. BuLL 11.
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In Uuited States v. Hallam,4 in its quest for the application of its strict construction doctrine, the Government
argued that a taxpayer could not rely upon the Capoeman
case if a specific allotment act was involved. The court
soundly overruled that proposition saying:
We find no merit in the contention that the
General Allotment Act is not applicable to the Quapaws or that members of that tribe should be treated
differently than the members of any other tribe of
Indians who were included within its provisions....
It is quite clear to us, considering the provisions
of the General Allotment Act and the special statutes
affecting the Quapaws, that Congress intended that
so long as they continued in their status as wards
of the United States, their allotted lands should be
treated in the same manner as those of all other
Indians encompassed by the General Allotment Act,
and that when a Quapaw allottee was determined to
be competent and capable of managing his or her
affairs, that person should have a title free from
any "charge or incumbrance." Squire v. Capoeman, supra, is not distinguishable in principle. 5
It is submitted that this case stands for a broad application
of Capoeman.
After enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act, Indians were afforded greater opportunity to govern themselves. Constitutional and corporate forms of governmental
structures were provided for by the Act. An interesting
question relating to the taxation of salaries and wages then
arose inasmuch as the officers or officials of tribal governments began to receive a salary from the tribes or communities for the services which they rendered. In Walker
v. Comm'r, the Tax Court held that Freeman Walker,
64. 304 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1962).
65. Id. at 622-23.
66. 37 T.C. 962 (1962). The Tax Court's decision was based on the protectionist

Indian policy rather than the tax laws. The Tax Court held that the
sums paid to Walker were not wages inasmuch as he was not an ordinary
employed citizen. It felt that "the amount paid to Walker was in reality
a distribution to him, as one of the beneficiaries of the trusteed tribal funds
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a noncompetent full-blood Indian, was not subject to tax
on his salary paid from tribal funds for his services as treasurer of the tribal community. Walker was appealed by the
Government, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, saying no exemption could be found for this type
of income." The appellate court based its decision on the
theory that even "If under the law, the income of an organization is exempt from taxation, it does not follow that
the income received by an employee as compensation for service rendered to such organization is also exempt from taxation. "" Thus, absent an exemption prescribed in a treaty or
congressional act, such income is taxable.
It is to be noted that the court of appeals in Walker
limited the application of Capoemnan. The taxpayer argued
that the income was not taxable as it was derived from tribal
lands, citing Capoelman, but the court rejected the argument
saying that the lower court had not made such a finding,
without which Capoeman was inapposite. Therefore, the apparent lesson is that Capoeman is applicable only to situations directly involving land. This proposition is supported
by the court's statement that "If it is desirable that the income of an Indian be exempt from taxation under the circumstances existing here, such exemption should be provided
by an Act of Congress and not by a court."" Conversely, it
has been at least tacitly stated that if Congress creates an
exception to an Indian's exemption from taxation such exception is to be narrowly construed."

67.
68.
69.
70.

which the Government held for the use of him and the other members of
his tribe." Id. at 971-72. The court's policy orientation was summed up
when the court stated:
Bearing in mind the Government's historic and carefully
developed undertaking to advance the training and competency of
its Indian wards, and also keeping in mind the established principle
that general Acts of Congress do not apply to Indians unless so
worded as to clearly manifest an intention to include Indians in
their operation-we regard the statement of the Supreme Court in
Squire v. Capoeman, supra, to be here apposite: "It is unreasonable
to infer that, in enacting the income tax law, Congress intended to
limit or undermine the Government's undertaking." Id. at 972.
Comm'r v. Walker, 326 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1964). See also Rev. Rul. 67-284,
1967-2 CUM. BULL. 55.
Comm'r v. Walker, supra note 67, at 264.
Id. at 264.
United States v. Daney, 370 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1966), aff'g 247 F. Supp.
533.
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The question of just what land affords income tax im7
munity remains incompletely resolved. Holt v. Comm 'r 1
dealt with a noncompetent Sioux who held a grazing permit
covering tribal land, and the question before the court was
the taxability of income arising from his cattle operation conducted on that tribal land. Under the permit, the taxpayer
paid an "agreed consideration" to the tribe, but the decision
does not indicate whether it was nominal or real. The court
of appeals, after reviewing the concepts and precedents
which have been discussed above, held that the income was
subject to federal tax. The court was obviously influenced by
the fact that non-Indians had similar permits and would be
subject to taxation on income earned by their use. The court
also found significance in the fact that an Indian has a specific personal interest in allotted land (the income from which
is tax-exempt) but that no individual Indian has any title or
6nforceable interest in tribal property covered by a permit
to him. According to the court, since the individual Indian
taxpayer could have no title nor enforceable right in the
tribal property, the exemption dictated by Capoeman was not
available. Thus, an Indian with a greater personal interest
in restricted property has the benefit of a tax exemption
which is not available to him if he has a lesser or no personal
interest in it. Considering the whole purpose of the aborted
allotment system and its replacement by tribal ownership,
each designed to assist Indians to achieve economic independence, the logic of the distinction for tax purposes is difficult to grasp.
The next significant development was the very important
decision of Stevens v. Corm'r," which dealt with a
very extensive farming and ranching enterprise of a noncompetent Gros Ventre Indian of the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation. The land involved various parcels of restricted
Indian land on the reservation, consisting generally of the
following types:
71. Holt v. Comm'r, supra note 21.
72. 452 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1971) aff'g and rev'g 52 T.C. 330 (1969); Supplemental Opinion 54 T.C. 351 (1970). See also J. WHITE, supra note 34, at
63-83 which contains an extensive analysis of the Tax Court opinion in
Stevens.
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1. Direct allotments to the Indian,
2. Gifts to the Indian from his mother of allotments

made to her,
3. Purchased or exchanged allotments from other Indians,
4. Grazing permits granted to the Indian by the tribe,
covering both tribal lands and numerous tracts of
other tribal members,
5. Oral leases from other tribal members, and
6. Hay cutting permits covering both tribal lands and
tracts of other tribal members.
Primarily on the basis of Holt, the Tax Court held that the
income from the direct and gift allotment parcels (Nos. 1
and 2) was not taxable, but the income from the purchased
or exchanged allotments and nonallotted parcels (Nos. 3-6)
was taxable after finding no exemption stated in the various
acts affecting the tribe and reservation. The parcels subject
to the permits and leases (Nos. 4-6) constituted the bulk of
the land utilized by the Indian, but the decision of the Tax
Court as to these lands was not appealed, and they were expressly not considered by the court of appeals.
The taxpayer appealed that portion of the Tax Court's
judgment holding that income from the purchased and exchanged allotment lands (No. 3) was not exempt from taxation. The Government appealed from that portion of the
judgment holding that income from all allotment lands acquired by the Indian by direct allotment and by gift (Nos.
1 and 2) were exempt from taxation. The court of appeals
resolved all issues in favor of the taxpayer. Although there
was extensive analysis in the decisions of both the Tax Court
and the court of appeals concerning the source and nature of
the allotments, the import of the court of appeals decision is
that income of a noncompetent Indian from allottcd and restricted lands is tax exempt irrespective of the means of transfer or disposition of such interests between the Government
and noncompetent Indians or between noncompetent Indians.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1975
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Perhaps the greatest contribution to the case law on the
subject was made by the court in Stevens when it recognized that "Federal policy toward particular Indian tribes is
often manifested through a combination of general laws,
special acts, treaties, and executive orders. All must be construed in pari materiain ascertaining Congressional intent. ""
It is arguable that such phraseology in the context of a tax
case stands for the proposition that tax exemption can be
drawn from the manifested general policy of the Government
toward Indians. This becomes important in that the decision
rebuts the Internal Revenue Service position of strict interpretation of exemptions from the tax laws. Additionally, the
case clearly stands for a broad interpretation of the scope
of Indian exemptions from taxation. 4
The Stevens opinion of the court of appeals quotes favorably from a letter from the Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior to the Solicitor General of the United States,
which is very pertinent to the income tax question in the
context of the conversion from the allotment system to
that of tribal ownership. In that letter the Solicitor stated:
"Many Indians have purchased trust lands, or
exchanged their allotments or interests in allotments
for trust lands which were then taken in trust for
them by the United States, with knowledge that the
income derived from that land to the former beneficial owner was not subject to encumbrance (and
therefore not taxable). Since the Indians were not
informed that they were giving up a right which
would not be included in the purchased tract, it is
natural that they would assume in making an exchange that the purchased tract was subject to the
same nonencumbrance provisions as those they held
under the General Allotment Act. The Federal Government has encouraged such purchases and exchanges in carrying out relocation and other econo73. Stevens v. Comm'r, supra note 72, at 744 citing Kirkwood v. Arenas, 243
F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1957) as authority for the proposition.
74. Stevens v. Comm'r, supra note 72, at 747, 749 supports this proposition.
The court's recognition of the Capoenwn reliance on language of earlier
cases to the effect that doubtful expressions are resolved in favor of the
Indians and that treaties should never be construed to the prejudice of the
Indians lends credence to the position taken here.
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mic programs and particularly in dealing with the
heirship land problem which has been growing increasingly difficult to administer as interests in
trust lands become more fractionated. Had this
question arisen and been settled in accordance with
the present assertion of the Internal Revenue Service soon after the Act of June 18, 1934, was enacted,
certainly the implication which has been conveyed to
Indians across the country could have been avoided."
(emphasis added)."
The pertinence of the foregoing is highlighted by the position
of the Internal Revenue Service that allotted restricted land
provides the immunity but that unallotted restricted land
does not.
There is ominous dictum in the Tax Court's Stevens
opinion relating to Revenue Ruling 62-16,7" which represents
the Internal Revenue Service's recognition that income of an
Indian from the sale or exchange of cattle and other livestock
raised on restricted allotted lands is exempt from federal
income taxation. Although non-taxability of such income
was conceded by the Internal Revenue Service, and the issue
was not before the Tax Court, the court nonetheless indicated that it might not agree with the Internal Revenue Service position and might treat such income as taxable." It suggested that proceeds from the sale of cattle might be treated
differently than that from the sale of timber.
The last case to be discussed here perhaps presents the
ultimate extension in the Internal Revenue Service strict interpretation position. United States v. Critzer" involved the
prosecution of an Eastern Cherokee Indian for criminal tax
fraud. The taxpayer had failed to report a portion of her
income derived from the operation of a motel and restaurant
and the lease of two gift shops and some apartments. The
businesses were located on land in which the taxpayer had a
"possessory holding." The lower court found the taxpayer
guilty of wilfully attempting to evade federal income taxes
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 748.
Rev. Rul. 62-16, 1962-1 CuM. BuLL 7.
Stevens v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 330, 339.
United States v. Critzer, supra note 10.
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for the years 1967-1970 in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, fined
her $10,000 and sentenced her to three years of imprisonment
which was suspended upon condition of her satisfaction of
her civil tax liability. The court of appeals avoided the issue
of whether the income was taxable. Rather, the court felt that
such an issue was more properly the subject of a civil suit
and left the taxpayer faced with another possible lawsuit.
However, the court did reverse her criminal conviction.
The basis of the court's decision was that as a matter of
law wilful intent to evade taxation was missing in that the
taxability of the income involved was "so uncertain that even
coordinate branches of the United States Government
plausibly reach directly opposing conclusions." 7 The court
had reference to the fact that the government brief on appeal
included a statement of the Department of the Interior, on
behalf of the Indian taxpayer, stating:
"[W]hile the issue is not free of all doubt, there
has been no definitive court holding, the Department
of the Interior for legal and policy reasons believes
that these possessory holdings are tax exempt to the
same extent as trust and restricted allotments found
on most Indian reservations....
Interior also believes that income from businesses conducted on tax exempt land, such as motels and
restaurants, should be included in the principle of
Squire v. Capoeman . . ."11
Although the Department of Interior's statement was drafted
with the obviously narrow context of the case in mind, it is
to be noted that the last sentence of the above-quoted portion
of the statement stands alone as a separate and distinct paragraph of the statement.8 1 Thus, the Department of the Interior, which is vested with the responsibility for the administration of Indian trust and restricted lands and the enforcement of the laws with respect to the Indians, clearly advocates that the laws dictate a broad exemption from federal
income taxation for Indians.
79. Id. at 1162
80. Id. The Interior Department's statement was confined to the taxpayer and
her holdings as a member of the Eastern Cherokee Reservation.
81. Id.
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It is submitted that in its method of adherence to the
Capoeman decision, and in setting forth in Revenue Ruling
67-284 its five tests for the exemption, the Internal Revenue
Service is perverting the meaning of Capoeman. Although it
is not specifically stated in the Capoeman decision, it would
appear that there was a judicial assumption that income from
restricted reservation land is not taxable, and it was the acquisition by an individual Indian of new, vested rights in the
form of an allotment which raised the question of taxation
of income. It further is submitted that the Supreme Court
was only holding that the exemption remained notwithstanding the allotment, while the land was still restricted. The
Court seemed to say that the land and the Indians were moving toward total emancipation, at which time there would be
full subjection to the tax laws, but that the exemption had not
been terminated at the way-station of the allotment status.
The Internal Revenue Service takes the position that
the granting of an allotment created the tax exemption in the
first instance, which exemption did not exist either before
the allotment or after its restrictions are removed. If that is
so, then the land, insofar as its income is concerned, passes
from a taxable status to a non-taxable status and back to a
taxable status. That is illogical when viewed against the
background of general Indian policy and law which commenced with maximum protection and supervision of the
Indians, then proceeded, through an intermediate step, toward
total emancipation. It is likely that the Supreme Court in
Capoeman analyzed and discussed the allotment aspects and
authorities to demonstrate that the exemption still existed, but
the Internal Revenue Service is interpreting that analysis as
supporting the notion of a creation of a new exemption. Although the Internal Revenue Service in its revenue rulings
and positions before the courts argues technical constructions
of the laws and the cases, it really appears to be taking the
arbitrary stand that it will not recognize any exemption unless
there is an express and specific statutory provision or Supreme Court decision for it.
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In the development of the law it appears that there is a
conflict between the federal tax policy and the federal Indian
policy. It has been resolved with regard to income from allotted and restricted land, reinvestment income, and shares upon
distribution of tribal income. It probably has been determined with regard to income from formal leases of tribal
lands to Indians, since certiorari was denied in the Holt case.
It has not been determined with regard to income from assigned tribal land, and a very strong argument exists that
such income should be treated the same as income from allotted and restricted land. The concepts at least under general
Indian law, are the same.
It is noted that in Revenue Ruling 67-284, in discussing
for income from allotted and restricted land, it
exemption
the
is stated that the exemption does not cease, "when restricted
allotted land is voluntarily exchanged for restricted allotted
land of like value, when such exchange is authorized by the
Secretary of the Interior."8 2 Although the interest acquired
by an Indian by an exchange assignment, or other mechanism
designed to return allotted land to tribal ownership, is not
"allotted land" the situation referred to in the ruling and
such an exchange are very comparable.
The point is that if an exemption exists for restricted
land which has been allotted to an individual Indian then
reasonably under law, policy, and logic the same exemption
should exist for restricted land which has been merely assigned to him by his tribe, or in which he has been granted
possessory or user rights. The allotment system was replaced
by the tribal ownership system because the former permitted
ultimate loss by Indians of their land. The substitution was
merely to provide a better tool for their use in achieving
economic well-being. The fact that an individual Indian
now receives his interest by grant from his tribe rather than
from the United States should make no difference insofar as
the tax exemption is concerned, particularly since the grant
from the tribe is of a considerably lesser legal estate than
that of an allotment which has been unavailable since 1934.
82. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 CuM. BuLL. 55, 57.
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